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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE*
By R. NEAL BATSON** and BEN F. JOHNSON, III***
I.

PERSONAL AND DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

McGovern v. American Airlines, Inc.I emphasizes the very simple oftneglected proposition that the plaintiff must allege jurisdiction and that
where jurisdiction depends on diversity of citizenship, citizenship must be
distinctly and affirmatively alleged. Senator GeorgeMcGovern filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas against American Airlines and a
number of other corporate defendants for civil recoveryof allegedly illegal
campaign contributions to former President Nixon. The jurisdictional allegation read:
1. Plaintiff is a citizen of South Dakota. Defendants are corporations
incorporated and having their principal places of business in states other
than South Dakota. The matter in controversy exclusive of interest and
costs is for a sum of excess of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00)3
One of the defendants, Gulf Oil Corp., moved to dismiss, and dismissal
was granted, without prejudice, on the ground that McGovern had failed
to allege a jurisdictional basis and venue. Rather than refile and replead,
as he was invited to do by the court, McGovern stood on his complaint and
moved to vacate the dismissal. The district court, quite predictably, once
again found the jurisdictional and venue allegation inadequate and again
dismissed. The Fifth Circuit not only affirmed the district court's dismissal
but also rejected McGovern's plea to amend. McGovern's refusal to cure
the jurisdictional defect when on notice of the defect and his continued
insistence on the "clearly defective allegation of diversity jurisdiction"
convinced the court to decline to allow amendment.3
Ed and Fred, Inc. v. PuritanMarine Insurance UnderwritersCorp.I presented an interesting diversity party lineup. The plaintiff was an alien,
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands. There were two defendants, one incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands and the
other incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts. Thus, an alien from
* This article, with limited exceptions, does not discuss procedural aspects of cases decided
in substantive law areas covered elsewhere in this survey edition.
** Partner in Alston, Miller & Gaines, Atlanta, Georgia; Adjunct Professor of Law, Emory
University School of Law (1973-74). Vanderbilt University (B.A., 1963; LL.B., 1966; J.D.,
1970). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in Alston, Miller & Gaines, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (B.A., 1965);
Harvard University (LL.B., 1968; J.D., 1969). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. 511 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. Id.at 654.
3. Id.
4. 506 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975).
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one country was suing a Massachusetts citizen and an alien from another
country. The Fifth Circuit concluded that complete diversity was lacking.
The Court's approach, which could be viewed as somewhat parochial, was
that all aliens are just aliens and should be treated as one class of residents
for purposes of determining whether there is complete diversity.
A number of 1975 Fifth Circuit decisions involved construction of state
long-arm statutes. In tort cases, the court generally adopted expansive
interpretations.
In Sells v. InternationalHarvester Co., Inc.,- a manufacturer who provided fan blades for use by International Harvester was sued along with
International Harvester in the Southern District of Alabama for damages
arising when one of its fan blades broke off from the engine of a truck being
driven by the plaintiff, penetrated the floorboard, and cut the plaintiffs
foot. The fan blade manufacturer was dismissed by the district court for
lack of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit, observing that the Alabama longarm statute extended to the limits of federal due process, found no violation of due process in requiring a manufacturer to defend products liability
suits in states where accidents occurred if the manufacturer sold its products there for inclusion in the products of a national distributor and knew
they ultimately would be used everywhere. The Fifth Circuit thus seemed
to rest jurisdiction under the Alabama long-arm statute, at least as to tort
cases, on an expansive "stream of commerce" theory.
Two similar cases dealt with the scope of state long-arm statutes in libel
contexts. In Edwards v. Associated Press,' the court construed the Mississippi long-arm statute,7 which permits long-arm service upon anyone "who
shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident of
this state." In Rebozo v. Washington Post Co.,' the court construed the
Florida long-arm statute,' which permits service upon anyone who "commits a tortious act within this state." In both cases, the defendants
claimed first that there had been no tort committed within the state whose
jurisdiction was sought to be invoked, and second that the first amendment gave jurisdictional insulation to newspapers and wire services beyond
that available to other types of defendants. In both cases, the Fifth Circuit
said the long-arm statutes should be construed as broadly as possible
without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In each case, the court found that the publication of allegedly libelous
material within the forum state was the commission of a tort within that
state for purposes of its long-arm statute. In each case, the court rejected
the claim that the first amendment provided insulation for newspapers
and wire services.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

513 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1975).
512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
Miss. CODE ANN. §13-3-57 (Supp. 1972).
515 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1975).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §48.193 (1973).
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Two 1975 cases adopted restrictive interpretations of state long-arm
statutes in construing "doing business" sections of the Texas and Georgia
statutes. In Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing, Inc.,'0 the plaintiff based
its claim of Texas jurisdiction on negotiations carried on by mail between
Texas and North Carolina, on the mailing of the contract to the plaintiff's
Texas place of business for signing, and on the allegation that a portion of
the contract was performed in Texas when the initial payment was mailed
from Texas to North Carolina. The court specifically noted that the
defendant's contact with Texas was exclusively through the mails. The
court denied that this was sufficient to invoke the Texas long-arm statute." The court held that the quality, nature, and extent of the defendant's
Texas contacts were not sufficient, taken individually or together, to satisfy the requirement that the defendant purposefully invoke the benefits
or protection of the law of Texas, especially where the defendant had never
sent any agent into nor caused any goods to be delivered into the state.
Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc.'2 was similar to Arthur, Ross & Peters,
except that the defendant had sent agents into Georgia. The court, however, noted that at the time the defendant sent its agents into Georgia the
business in question had already been consummated.
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Arrow Aluminum Castings Co.'3 dealt with the
question of whether "cause of action" in the Georgia long-arm statute
would embrace all legal theories of relief growing out of the event that
generated jurisdiction or whether it would be limited to those legal theories
that directly arose from the event that generated jurisdiction. The court
held that the jurisdiction, once conferred by a long-arm statute, embraced
all theories of relief related to the jurisdiction-generating event and could
include both tort and contract theories. This embracing of a possible contract theory could occur even where the defendant had not "transacted
business" in the forum state sufficient to invoke the lone-arm statute as
an independent matter.'4

II.

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit in 1975 defined the expanse of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in a number of civil rights cases. In Adkins v. Duval County
School Board,' the court held that school boards were not "persons" under
42 U.S.C.A. §1983 so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal
10. 508 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2031b(4) (1964).
12. 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975). The statute involved was GA. CODE ANN. §24-113.1(a)
(Rev. 1971).
13. 510 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1975).
14. Id. at 1033.
15. 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
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courts under 28 U.S.C.A. §1343.16 This decision was previewed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,7 which had held that a
municipality is not a "person" within section 1983, and Moor v. County
of Alameda,' which had held that a county was not a "person" within
section 1983. The Fifth Circuit found no controlling distinction between a
school board and a municipality or county. The court, therefore, held
school boards not to be "persons" and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §1343(3), the
only claimed jurisdictional basis.
In Parishv. National CollegiateAthletic Association," the Fifth Circuit
followed the lead of a number of other courts"0 and held that the actions
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association were "under color of state
law" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 so as to confer jurisdiction
on district courts under 28 U.S.C.A. §1343(3). The court noted that only
one court had ruled to the contrary" and declined to follow that court's
analysis. The Fifth Circuit found that state-supported educational institutions and their members and officers played a substantial role in the
NCAA's program, and that state participation in or support of nominally
2
private activity was a well recognized basis for a finding of state action.'
Roane v. CallisburgIndependent School District 3 involved a determination of the expanse of "property" interests protected by 42 U.S.C.A.
§ §1981 and 1983 so as to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts under 28
U.S.C.A. §1331. Roane, a school superintendent, was discharged by the
Callisburg school board without a hearing, allegedly in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. The Fifth Circuit noted the recent expansion of
the number of property interests which had been held to be subject to the
42 U.S.C.A. §1983 (Rev. 1974) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C.A. §1343 (Rev. 1962) in subdivision (3) provides for jurisdiction in federal courts:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
17. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).
18. 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).
19. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974); Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 367 F.Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1973); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F.Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
21. McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F.Supp. 625 (C.D.Cal. 1974).
22. In support of this conclusion the court cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), and Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 462
F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975).
16.
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fourteenth amendment's procedural protections.24 Although the court
noted that "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is
not infinite, 2 5 it found that Roane had the equivalent of tenure in his
administrative post under the "common law" of the Callisburg Independent School District and held that he did have a "property" interest protected by 42 U.S.C.A. §§1981 and 1983 so as to invoke jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C.A. §1331.
Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp."6 involved the breadth of the
interpretation to be given to the phrase "state action" under section 1983.
A physician sued the Orange Memorial Hospital Corp. and contended that
the refusal of the hospital to permit its facilities to be used for the performance of non-therapeutic abortions was unconstitutional and deprived the
physician of rights protected by section 1983. The district court dismissed
the complaint, finding no "state action" to confer subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the doctrine of
''state action" developed primarily in the area of racial discrimination.
Absent a charge of racial discrimination, the court was "disinclined to
press the state action doctrine and all that it entails into the internal
affairs of a hospital. '2 The court refused to apply state action concepts
designed to ferret out racially discriminatory policies to areas unaffected
by racial discrimination, noting the "potentially explosive impact" such
2
might have .
Somewhat similar analysis was applied in Mississippi v. McCollum, 9 a
case involving an interpretation of the removal provisions of 28 U.S.C.A.
§1443.36 McCollum, a defendant in a Mississippi court charged with armed
robbery, based his removal petition on the claim that he was being denied
his right to a speedy trial in the state court. The Fifth Circuit, affirming
the district court's remand of the case to the state court, held that the
24. Id. at 638, citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct, 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S.
551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97
L.Ed. 216 (1952).
25. 511 F.2d at 638, quoting from Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705,
33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556-57 (1972).
26. 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 882.
28. Id. at 879.
29. 513 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1975).
30. 28 U.S.C.A. §1443 (Rev. 1973) provides for removal jurisdiction in civil and criminal
actions brought in state courts
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of the citizens of
the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law.
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removal statute applied only to cases involving denials of civil rights for
racial reasons and not to deprivals of the right to a speedy trial. The court
noted that McCollum was white, that he alleged no racial motive in
connection with his inability to obtain a speedy trial, and that the right
to a speedy trial was not a specific civil right couched in terms of equality
but was rather a broad constitutional guarantee of general application.
The court concluded that such a broad constitutional guarantee, as opposed to a specific civil right, could not serve as the basis for removal under
28 U.S.C.A. §1443.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts to review administrative action was
the subject of several 1975 cases. In Ortego v. Weinberger,"' the court
considered whether federal courts had jurisdiction to review, for abuse of
discretion, the refusal of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
to reopen prior applications for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. This question had been presented to five other circuit courts. Only
the Ninth Circuit had held that the Secretary's decision was a matter of
unfettered discretion and therefore was unreviewable. 2 The other four circuits had held that the federal courts had jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision for abuse of discretion.3 3 The Fifth Circuit pointed to
sections 10(a), 10(c) and 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act 4 and
found that the Act presented a clear right to judicial review without a
correspondingly clear jurisdictional basis for review. The Fifth Circuit,
nevertheless, sided with the majority of those courts ruling on the question
and permitted review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act.
A similar situation was presented in Winningham v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 35 which involved a challenge by a resident of a subsidized housing project, of the constitutionality
of section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,31 which
authorizes rent supplements for tenants moving to a subsidized housing
project from substandard housing but not for tenants who had not previously lived in substandard housing. The plaintiff alleged subject matter
31. 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975).
32. Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Ruiz-Olan v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 511 F.2d 1056 (1st Cir.
1975); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1972); Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F.24
617 (6th Cir. 1972); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. Section 10(a), codified at 5 U.S.C.A. §702 (Rev. 1967), states: "A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof." Section 10(c),
5 U.S.C.A. §704 (Rev. 1967), states: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."
Section 10(e), 5 U.S.C.A. §706 (Rev. 1967), requires reviewing courts to "(2) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. .. .
35. 512 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. 12 U.S.C.A. §1701s (Rev. 1969).
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jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C.A. §1337.11 The Fifth Circuit observed
that subject matter jurisdiction existed only if the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965 was an act regulating commerce. After reviewing
the legislative history of the Act, the court concluded that the commerce
clause was a significant source of the congressional power underlying the
rent supplement program and that section 101 of the Act regulates commerce for purposes of conferring subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.A. §1337.
In Dickson v. Ford,3 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of an action
on the ground that it stated a non-justiciable political question. The plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 197331 on the ground that it provided foreign assistance to the
state of Israel, which "was created by and is an instrument of the larger
entity known as the 'Jewish People'" and was thus prohibited by the
establishment clause of the first amendment." The court held the question
to be non-justiciable because it related to the power of the President and
the Congress to conduct foreign affairs.
Southern Electric Steel Co. v. FirstNationalBank of Birmingham4 held
12 U.S.C.A. §94, providing for venue of suits against national banks, to be
a venue statute and nothing more. The court said it does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear all matters involving national banks.
Since the case did not involve diversity of citizenship and all legal questions were purely ones of state law, the court directed that the action be
dismissed.
III.

ANCILLARY AND PENDENT JURISDICTION

Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Houston National Bank"2 was a claim
brought by Nishimatsu against the bank to recover under a letter of credit.
The bank denied its liability on the letter of credit and filed a third-party
complaint against Southeast Construction Co. (Secon) and its agent Baize,
alleging that they were obligated to reimburse the bank for any sums which
it had to pay Nishimatsu under the letter of credit by a reimbursement
agreement they executed in connection with the application for the letter
of credit. The bank also alleged that Secon and Baize were liable to it on
a demand note. Baize contended that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over both claims asserted against him in the bank's
37. This section grants district courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies."
38. 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
39. 87 Stat. 836 (1973). The act is not codified.
40. Id. at 235.
41. 515 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. 515 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1975).
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third-party complaint. With regard to the claim on the reimbursement
agreement, the Fifth Circuit held that the claim was clearly within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the district court. The court held the note claim
not to be within the court's ancillary jurisdiction. The court reiterated that
a claim, to be within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court, had to
bear a logical relationship "to the aggregate core of operative facts which
constitutes the main claim over which the court has an independent basis
of federal jurisdiction. ,43 The court held that the bank's note claim lacked
the requisite logical relationship to either the letter of credit claim against
the bank or to the bank's third-party claim based on the reimbursement
agreement. The court held the judgment based on the note void for want
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Florida East Coast Railway v. United States44 presented an interesting
pendent jurisdiction problem. Under the Flood Control Act of 1948, 45 the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers undertook to implement the Central and
Southern Florida Flood Control Project. Two levees of the project paralleled one of the railroad's branch lines known at the K-line. The Flood
Control District acquired the land and the right of way for construction of
the project and worked with the Corps of Engineers in construction. In
1968, the Corps of Engineers awarded the principal construction contract
to Troop Brothers, Inc., which worked under the supervision of the Corps
of Engineers and was responsible for completion in accordance with the
plans and specifications drawn by the Corps. Troop Brothers in turn hired
Cross Contracting Co. to perform the excavation work and to install some
of the flood control project structures. In October, 1969, an extraordinarily
heavy rainfall caused a washout on the K-line. After this washout, the
Flood Control District and the Corps of Engineers both recognized the
deficiencies in the design of the flood control system, but neither warned
the railroad nor took any steps to correct the defects. In March, 1970, a
second washout occurred during another heavy rainfall and caused the
derailment of a Florida East Coast train. The railroad sued the United
States and Cross claiming approximately $438,000 damages as a result of
the two washouts. Cross filed a third-party complaint against the Flood
Control District, and the United States filed a third-party complaint
against Troop Brothers. Shortly thereafter, the railroad amended its complaint to assert claims directly against Troop Brothers and the Flood Control District. Troop Brothers unsuccessfully moved for a dismissal of th
railroad's claims against it, contending that the district court had no jurisdiction over those claims because there was no diversity between Troop
Brothers and the railroad. After a trial before the district court sitting
43. Id. at 1205, quoting from Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426
F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1970).
44. 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 33 U.S.C.A. §702c (Rev. 1970).
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without a jury, judgment was entered in favor of the United States on the
ground that it was immune from liability for flood damages in connection
with flood control projects. Cross and Troop Brothers were held liable on
theories of negligent construction and negligent supervision. The Flood
Control District was also found liable on a variety of theories.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that there was no diversity between
the railroad and Troop Brothers and that, therefore, the only viable basis
for asserting the claim in a federal court was pendent jurisdiction. There
were two difficulties with pendent jurisdiction: (1) the federal claim had
been disposed of on the immunity issue and (2) the federal and the state
claims were not asserted against the same party, since federal claims were
asserted against the Government and the state claims were asserted
against Troop Brothers, a third-party defendant. Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit found that there was pendent jurisdiction and affirmed the district
court. The court adopted the test of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,46
requiring that the primary claim present a substantial federal question and
that the pendent claim "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."
The Fifth Circuit found that the primary federal claim was substantial not "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,"
"obviously frivolous," or "no longer open to discussion" 47-and that, therefore, the district court was not deprived of jurisdiction over the pendent
claim just because it eventually concluded that the railroad could not
recover from the United States. The court stated that the jurisdiction of
the district court to hear the pendent claim is dependent upon the substantiality of the claim stated in the complaint, not upon the plaintiffs ultimately obtaining a judgment. The court also found that the pendent claim
derived from the same set of operative facts as the main claim. Finally,
the court held that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may be invoked to
join a new party even though the only cause of action involving the new
party is a state claim.
IV.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

Carr v. Veterans Administration" is another warning to persons who
litigate with the Government that they can expect strict construction of
all statutory language limiting rights of actions against the Government.
The plaintiff's claim was held barred by 28 U.S.C.A. §2401(b)2 and Rule
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure49 because the U.S. Marshall
46. 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
47. 519 F.2d at 1194, quoting from Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39
L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).
48. 522 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. The statute sets out the basic statute of limitations for tort claims against the United
States. The rule provides for relation back of amendments to the date of the original pleadings.
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delayed eight days in serving the complaint; an amendment adding the
United States as a party was not timely since the Government had not
received notice within the six-month statutory period. The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that delivery of process to the U.S. Marshall for
service was constructive notice to the United States, stating that such a
contention would mean the United States had instant notice of every complaint once it was given to a federal marshall for service.
Two cases, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Griffin
Wheel Co. 50 and Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.,' involved
statute of limitations problems in the context of the equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Reeb dealt with construction of 42 U.S.C.A.
§2000e-5(d), requiring that a person seeking relief from employment discrimination file a charge with the Commission within ninety days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.52 The Fifth Circuit had to
consider whether the ninety-day provision barred a suit by a plaintiff who
had not learned or could not reasonably have learned of facts that would
support a charge of an unlawful employment practice until the specified
time period had already passed. The court determined that the time limitations contained in the statute were not inflexible jurisdictional absolutes
and that they should be modified in appropriate cases in the interest of
giving effect to the broad remedial purposes of the Act. The court noted
that if there were concealment of facts, the party responsible for the concealment would be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense. The case was remanded to the district court for findings as to
when the plaintiff should have discovered the discrimination and whether
there was any concealment by the defendant.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Griffin Wheel Co.
posed the issue of the applicable period of limitations for an action brought
by the Commission under §706 of Title VII. 53 The court referred to its
earlier opinion in United States v. Georgia Power Co.," which held that
where the Government is suing to collect sums due to individual citizens,
rather than to the Treasury, it was a private and not a public action, so
the general proscription against the application of state statutes of limitation to the United States was not applicable. The court adopted the reasoning of Beard v. Stevens5 5 that where Congress has created federal rights
without prescribing a limitation period for enforcing them, the federal
courts should borrow the most closely analogous state statute of limitations
50. 511 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1975).
51. 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. The section has been redesignated as 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5(e) (Rev. 1974), and the
90-day time limit has been expanded to 180 days.
53. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5 (Rev. 1974). This is the general enforcement provision empowering the EEOC to prevent unlawful employment practices.
54. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
55. 372 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1967)..
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prescribed by the forum state. Thus, the court held an Alabama one-year
statute to be applicable on the back-pay question, although it remanded
the case to determine exactly when the statute commenced to run. Insofar
as the Commission was seeking to enjoin practices contrary to thepublic
policy of the United States - as opposed to bringing back-pay claims for
individuals - the federal government or its agencies were suing to enforce
rights belonging to the sovereign; therefore, state statutes of limitation
were not applicable, the court decided.
Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp.5" dealt with the
question of when the statute of limitations commences running in an un57
lawful antitrust conspiracy under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act..
The district court had held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the
four-year statute of limitations found in 15 U.S.C.A. §15b on the theory
that the plaintiff's claim arose essentially from the defendant's refusal in
1961 to continue dealing with the plaintiff. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
said the question was
whether the alleged continuing conspiracy and monopoly . . . is to be
treated for statute of limitations purposes as a single act . . . occurring
with the original refusal to deal on May 16, 1961 . . . or whether it may
be viewed as a continuing series of acts upon which successive causes of
action may accrue. 8
The Fifth Circuit held the latter view to be correct and held that continuing antitrust conduct resulting in a continued invasion of a plaintiff's
rights may give rise to continually accuring rights of action. The court
noted, nevertheless, that a newly accruing claim for damages must be
based on some injurious act actually occurring during the limitations period and not merely on some consequence of a pre-limitations action. The
court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether some specific injurious act actually occurred during the four-year
limitation period.
V.

STANDING

Korioth v. Briscoe 9 was a suit brought by a member of the Texas legislature as a United States citizen from Texas, a taxpayer, and a state legislator alleging that the establishment of regional planning agancies under
Texas law violated both the federal and the Texas constitutions. The substance of Korioth's challenge was never reached; the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Korioth case provided the Fifth
Circuit an opportunity to apply recent Supreme Court decisions in the
56.
57.
58.
59.

517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. §§1 and 2 (Rev. 1973).
517 F.2d at 125.
523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975).
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standing area."' The Fifth Circuit analyzed Korioth's possible standing
from each of the three perspectives claimed: citizen, taxpayer, and legislator. In analyzing whether citizen Korioth had standing, the court noted
that the test was whether he had alleged any injury which distinguished
him from the undifferentiated mass of the public; the specific, distinct
injury might be small, the court observed, but some such injury had to be
alleged in order for a litigant to have standing. The Fifth Circuit found that
the thin ice which might have supported generalized citizen standing to
pursue "public actions" seemed to have melted under Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War. The court said the major theme in
the cases rejecting generalized citizen standing was that if all citizens are
affected in an undifferentiated way by some alleged governmental illegality, recourse should be through the political process and that the political
process was constitutionally preferred as a method for resolving such disputes. The court concluded that citizen Korioth had suffered no such
distinct injury and did not have standing.
Korioth claimed taxpayer standing on the basis of Flast v. Cohen." The
Flast tests for taxpayer standing are: (1) some logical link between the
taxpayer status and the legislation being attacked and (2) a nexus between
the taxpayer status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged, or, in other words, that the challenged enactment exceed
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power. The Fifth Circuit found Korioth
challenging an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the adminstration of
an essentially regulatory statute. Therefore, he was unable to show that the
challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the taxing and spending power. The court noted:
We need not here decide what remains of the fading Flast doctrine, since
Korioth would not have standing under the Flast test even if it were
broadly construed.2
Lastly, the court examined the standing of Korioth as a legislator. The
court noted that those cases which had implied that a legislator had some
special standing63 had been based on allegations that the challenged action
undermined the effectiveness of the exercise of a specific power of the
individual legislator. The court found that these cases did not indicate that
a legislator, simply by virtue of that status, had some special right t6
invoke judicial consideration of the validity of a statute. Korioth v. Briscoe
60. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41
L.Ed.2d 706 (1974), and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d
678 (1974).
61. 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
62. 523 F.2d at 1277.
63. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) and Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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reflects the retreat, signalled by the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, from the advanced standing positions of the late 1960's and
early 1970's permitting the bringing of "public actions."
United States v. United States District Court64 involved a petition by the
United States for either (1) a writ of prohibition ordering the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas to dissolve a preliminary injunction in
a pending case and to dismiss the case or (2) a writ of mandamus directing
the court to transfer the case to the District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas. The standing problem was that the United States was not a party
to the pending case. The Fifth Circuit denied the extraordinary relief requested by the United States and stated that it knew of no authority which
would allow a non-party standing to seek a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the circumstances presented in the case. The court also said that,
even if standing had existed, the United States had not shown any clear
and indisputable right to any extraordinary writ.
In Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club,6 5 black and Jewish applicants
for membership in the Biscayne Bay Yacht Club brought an action challenging the allegedly discriminatory admissions policies of the club. The
defendant contended that the plaintiffs did not possess sufficient standing
to assail the membership policies of the club. The Fifth Circuit made short
shrift of this contention. It said that the indispenable requirement of
standing was that the party have some personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy; since the existing membership policies of the club being
attacked had been the basis of the club's refusal to accept the plaintiffs'
applications, the requisite standing was present.
VI.

THREE-JUDGE COURTS

During the past year, the Fifth Circuit continued to express its dissatisfaction with the necessity for convening three-judge courts under 28
U.S.C.A. §2281.66
The court went beyond a mere expression of dissatisfaction, however,
and construed the statute narrowly so as to further limit its use. Accordingly, the court held that a three-judge court is not required where an
action is brought against local officials enforcing a local ordinance. 7 This
is true even though the state enabling statute, pursuant to which the local
ordinance was enacted, is also being challenged.
A three-judge court need not be convened where an administrative
"practice," as opposed to a rule or regulation, is being challenged, either. 8
64. 506 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. See Driskell v. Edwards, 518 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1975).
67. Tramel v. Schrader, 505 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Texas,
508 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975).
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In Hoffman v. United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development," the Fifth Circuit held that a three-judge bench is not required in an action challenging the constitutionality of a state power-ofsale, mortgage-foreclosure statute. In so holding, the court noted that the
Texas statute regulates rights between private parties and, being selfeffectuating, does not require enforcement by state officials.
In an effort to minimize further the burden imposed on the federal
judiciary by the requirement of three-judge courts, the court held that once
a staute has been declared invalid by the three-judge panel, all remaining
issues should be remanded to a single judge. Accordingly, the ancillary
question of attorney's fees should be ruled upon by a single judge. 0
In Weiser v. White,7 ' a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the
court held that an appeal from the denial of intervention by a three-judge
court must be to the Supreme Court. The Court bottomed its decision on
the orderly process of judicial administration and noted that the Eighth
72
Circuit had reached the same result.
VII.

CLASS ACTIONS

In LaChapellev. Owens-Illinois, Inc. ,7 the court held that under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19677 only "opt-in" kinds of class
actions may be utilized in age discrimination cases. Accordingly, such
actions cannot be maintained as class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the opt-in kind of class action, no person
can become a class action plaintiff unless such person affirmatively opts
into the class by filing a written consent.
In Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp.,75 the court was confronted with
an attack on certain district court orders enforcing a stipulation of settlemnt. Upholding the settlement orders, the Fifth Circuit held that the
notice requirements of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply where the court has ruled that the action cannot be properly
maintained as a class action and the settlement does not directly, adversely affect the rights of persons not before the court.
Finally, in Jones v. Diamond,7 the court assists the practitioner by
reviewing many of the established legal principles applicable in class actions.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

519 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1975).
Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975).
505 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1975).
Doe v. Turner, 488 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1973).
513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
29 U.S.C.A. §§621-634 (Rev. 1967).
522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975).
519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).
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VIII.

STAYS,

ABSTENTION,

TRANSFER, AND CERTIFICATION

In Southwest Industrial Import and Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co.," the
Fifth Circuit reviewed a denial of an application for a stay pending arbitration. The contracts giving rise to the suit had unlimited, unconditional,
and concededly valid arbitration clauses providing that all disputes relating to or arising out of the contracts should be submitted to arbitration.
The district court found that certain self-help measures of the seller and
settlement negotiations which had been conducted between the seller and
the buyer constituted a waiver by the seller of his right to arbitration. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that courts should endeavor to give full
effect to arbitration agreements, not only to effectuate the intent of the
parties but also to ease congestion of court dockets. The case would appear
to be a message to district courts not to reach to find waiver of a party's
contractual right to arbitrate, but rather, wherever possible, to stay proceedings to promote arbitration of disputes."8
In Carr v. Grace,7" the court faced the question of whether a federal
district court having concurrent jurisdiction to hear a case that had also
been filed in a state court should dismiss rather than stay its proceeding
stay its proceeding pending state resolution of the suit. The district court
had entered a dismissal without prejudice. The court admitted that in
some fact settings a dismissal without prejudice arguably approximated a
stay. However, in Carr, the statute of limitations had run on the federal
claim, so, although the dismissal was "without prejudice," the case could
not be brought again. The court held that a federal court may not abdicate
its authority simply because a similar action is pending in a state court.
The Fifth Circuit discussed the abstention docrine in a number of cases.
In Neal v. Brim, 0 a Texas state district attorney brought a proceeding
under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 claiming that he was being deprived of due process by a state district judge who had convened a court of inquiry to
determine whether the district attorney had acted unlawfully in the conduct of his office. The district attorney and the judge had frequently disagreed about the administration of justice in the district. In the court of
inquiry proceeding the district attorney had moved to have the district
judge excuse himself because of his personal bias toward the district attorney. The judge had denied the motion. The Fifth Circuit held that the
district attorney's §1983 claim was not one wholly insubstantial or frivo77. 524 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1975).
78. Although the Southwest Industrialcase was a per curiam opinion, it may be important
in demonstrating the significant interest of the court in making its message clear to district
courts, since orders denying stays are generally not appealable. See Anderson v. United
States, 520 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1975). The appealability issue is not discussed in Southwest
Industrial.
79. 516 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. 506 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1975).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

lous and that, therefore, the federal court had jurisdiction in the case. The
court abstained, however, from ruling on the merits of the district attorney's claim on the ground that the Supreme Court of Texas has statutory
authority to issue extraordinary writs against any district judge who should
be disqualified. The Fifth Circuit noted the interest of Texas in maintaining the fairness and integrity of its own judicial processes and held that
the Texas courts ought to have the first opportunity to resolve the issues
presented by the district attorney's petition. The court suggested that the
district attorney proceed in the Texas courts without prejudice to his right
to reassert his federal claims to relief should he be denied effective relief
by the Texas courts.
In Johns-ManvilleProducts Corp. v. Doyal,81 the Fifth Circuit held that
abstention is proper only where there is an issue of state law which is
uncertain.8 2 One judge dissented in Johns-Manville on the ground that
although the state law was relatively clear, there was then pending in the
Louisiana Supreme Court a case which might have a significant bearing
on the outcome of the claim presented to the federal court in JohnsManville.
In MTM, Inc. v. Baxley,3 the Fifth Circuit took occasion to apply the
recent Supreme Court decision of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.," holding that
a civil nuisance suit brought by the state is closely akin to a state criminal
proceeding and, therefore, federal courts should not enjoin such state court
proceedings in the absence of Younger v. Harris5 exceptions. Those exceptions are: (1) where enforcement of the state nuisance statute is undertaken in bad faith for harassment purposes, (2)' where not enjoining the
state proceeding would effect great and immediate irreparable injury, and
(3) where the state nuisance statute is so flagrantly unconstitutional that
no limiting construction by the state courts, could possibly save it. The
court found none of the Younger exceptions' applicable in MTM and affirmed the district court's refusal to reach the merits of the plaintiffs
request for a federal injunction.
In Carter v. Ogden Corp.- the district court had enjoined Ogden from
filing or prosecuting any other suit against Carter. Ogden had brought an
action in a Delaware state court similar to one pending in the Louisiana
district court. The Delaware state court action had been removed by
Carter to the Delaware federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's injunction against.Ogden was barred by 28 U.S.C.A. §2283. 7
81. 510 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 1198, citing Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (1970),
and Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965).
83. 523 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1975).
84. 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975).
85. 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
86. 524 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. 28 U.S.C.A. §2283 (Rev. 1965) states:
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The Fifth Circuit held that section 2283 means what it says and that the
district court should not have enjoined the Delaware proceedings. Of
course, at the time the injunction was granted, there was no action pending
in any state court in Delaware, since the Delaware state court proceeding
had been removed to the federal court. Apparently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the federal district court in Delaware on removal was, under
Erie, sitting as another state court; therefore, the proscription of section
2283 applied to the Delaware federal court sitting in a diversity action as
well as to the state courts of Delaware.
In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Federal Power Commission," review of a
Federal Power Commisssion ruling was sought in the Fifth Circuit. Under
section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act," proper venue for review of a FPC
order is in the circuit "wherein the natural gas company to which the order
relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia . . . ." The Fifth
Circuit concluded that venue was improper before it. The court speculated
that venue was probably appropriate in either the Seventh Circuit or the
Eighth Circuit on the basis of the petitioner's "principal place of business"
but was unquestionably proper in the District of Columbia Circuit. The
court recognized its inherent power to transfer a petition for review of an
agency ruling to a circuit with proper venue and transferred the matter to
the District of Columbia Circuit. The court, in an earlier opinion,90 had
concluded that it was powerless to order such a transfer. In GeorgiaPacific, the court noted that subsequent cases" had convinced it that it
did have the inherent power to transfer a case even without any express
statutory grant so providing.
Barnes v. Atlantic & Pacific Life Insurance Co. of America" was, according to the Fifth Circuit, "a historic case." It was the first published opinion
utilizing the certification provisions recently placed in the Alabama Constitution.93 Such certification procedures are already in effect in Florida
and Louisiana. Although there is nothing new about certification of state
law questions to state courts in Erie cases, the Fifth Circuit in 1975 seemed
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
88. 512 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. 15 U.S.C.A. §717r(b) (Rev. 1963).
90. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964).
91. Koehring Co. v. Hyde Const. Co., 382 U.S. 362, 86 S.Ct. 522, 15 L.Ed.2d 416 (1966);
Municipal Distrib. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co. v. FPC, 343 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1965); and Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 337 F.2d
249 (10th Cir. 1964).
92. 514 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. ALA. CONST. art. VI, §140(b)(3) states: "The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction... (3) to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States."
Quoted at 514 F.2d at 705, n.1.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

inclined to utilize the procedures where available. In addition to the
Barnes case, questions were certified to state supreme courts in Tyler v.
Insurance Co. of North America94 and in Nardone v. Reynolds.95
IX.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs ...
Whether this rule means what it says was the subject of Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters." The appellant
sought to read into Rule 41 th'e judicial interpretation given by the Second
Circuit in Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,97 in which
that court refused to permit a plaintiff to dismiss by notice following an
extensive hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction. In Pilot Freight,
the appellant asked the Fifth Circuit to hold that a Rule 41(a) dismissal
is unavailable to a plaintiff who has argued and lost a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The plaintiff had been served with neither an answer
nor a motion for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit refused to apply
to Rule 41(a)(1) the Harvey Aluminum gloss. The court held that if it
engrafted onto Rule 41(a)(1) an interpretation preventing dismissal whenever the merits of a controversy had been presented to the court in any
manner, it would amount to nothing less than an amendment and a
comprehensive modification of Rule 41(a)(1). The court held that such an
amendment might be an appropriate action by the Supreme Court and the
Congress, but not by the Fifth Circuit.
In Riegel FiberCorp. v. Anderson Gin Co. , the Fifth Circuit denounced
in a footnote the inconvenience that results from the promiscuous use of
Rule 41(b) dismissals. The court stated that, except in unusually clear
cases, a district judge should either carry the defendant's Rule 41(b) motion with the case or deny it and let the defendant put on his evidence and
then enter a final judgment at the close of that evidence.
The Fifth Circuit reversed a number of docket control dismissals which
had been entered for docket offenses great and small but not quite great
enough. In GreaterBaton Rouge Golf Ass'n v. Recreation and Park Commission for the Parishof East Baton Rouge,9" the Fifth Circuit reversed a
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

520
508
506
203
512
507

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

341
660
914
105
784
227

(5th Cir. 1975).
(5th Cir. 1975).
(5th Cir. 1975).
(2d Cir. 1953).
(5th Cir. 1975).
(5th Cir. 1975).
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dismissal with prejudice entered when the plaintiff's counsel was twentyeight minutes late to a hearing. Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to vacate
the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He
alleged that he had been detained at a hearing in a state court, that he
had attempted to reschedule the state court argument for a later hour but
had been assured by the state court judge that he would be through in time
to make his federal court appearance, that the state court argument was
lengthier than had been anticipated, and that counsel had been unable to
depart the state courthouse until after he was scheduled to appear in
federal court. The plaintiff's counsel,had gone directly to the federal courthouse from the state courthouse. The Fifth Circuit concluded that although the plaintiff's counsel should have notified the district judge that
he would be detained, a dismissal with prejudice was too harsh a remedy
for the "inept, although unintentional" conduct of counsel. The court
noted that counsel might well have been disciplined for his tardiness, but
under the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff should not have been put
out of court with prejudice.
Local 66, AFL-CIO v. Leona Lee Insulation and Specialties, Inc. ,oo was
a similar case. The court described the case as being one
in which a too busy lawyer and a too busy Judge were trying to communicate through legitimate intermediaries with a resulting series of misunderstandings that in retrospect ought not to have occurred but which lack any
suggestion of contumatious indifference to the Court of the kind we generally regard as requisite to the use of this severe sanction.101
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing the appellant's case with prejudice because of the failure of its counsel to appear at
the time the case was scheduled for trial. In Brown v. O'Leary,' 2 a plaintiff's case was dismissed sua sponte by the district court for want of prosecution because of the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear at a docket
call. The plaintiff's counsel contended that he had received no notice of
the docket call and that he would be prepared to try the case at anytime
set by the court. The district court denied plaintiffs counsel's motion to
reinstate the action. Extensive discovery had been undertaken and completed. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that although the district court
should not be disturbed in the exercise of sound discretion in keeping its
calender under control, the court would not approve sanctions that were
not commensurate with the dereliction. The court held that where there
was a lost or misdelivered notice of a docket call and there was no showing
of prejudice to any party, a sua sponte dismissal and a refusal to reinstate
the cause upon motion was an abuse of discretion.
100.
101.
102.

516 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 505.
512 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1975).

MERCER LAW REVIEW
X.

[Vol. 27

PARTIES AND INTERVENTION

In United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.,' °3 the Fifth Circuit examined
the question of whether local teamsters unions representing the defendant's employees were indispensable parties in an employment discrimination case in which the international union was a party. Rule 19(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for joinder of parties "if feasible." The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's refusal to require
joinder of the local unions was correct, since they were scattered across the
country. The court found that the international union played the major
role in contract negotiations and in all other questions involved in the
litigation and held that the locals, therefore, were not indispensable parties. In so ruling, the court aligned itself with a number of other courts on
the question.'04
Two cases in the intervention area deserve note. United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc."'° held that there was no intervention
of right under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a
"pattern of practice" case under section 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.10 This is to be distinguished from a case brought under section
706, which confers upon "persons aggrieved" a right to intervene in a civil
action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission., 7 In
Korioth v. Briscoe,'1 the Fifth Circuit made it clear that one of the factors
appropriate for consideration by a district court considering a request for
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was whether the main claim into which intervention was sought
was legally sufficient. The court stated that it could not say that it was
clearly unreasonable for the district court to "prefer not to create a commensalist for a non-existent host."'0 9 The court noted that there was no
apparent barrier precluding the potential intervenor from bringing a new
action in its own name.
XI.

PLEADING

Several 1975 cases dealt with questions of pleading and the time for
pleading. In Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers,"' ° the district court had
103. 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. United States v. Roadway Express, Inc., 457 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Sabala v.
Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F.Supp. 1142 (S.D.Tex. 1973); United States v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 519 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
105. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-6 (Rev. 1974).
107. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5(f)(1) (Rev. 1974).
108. 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975). The facts of this case are summarized in the text
accompanying note 59, supra.
109. Id. at 1279.
110. 517 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1975).

1976]

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

denied motions to amend answers in order to assert additional counterclaims sixteen months after the original answers and counterclaims had
been filed. The district court's order had given no explanation for the
refusal to permit the filing of the amended answers. The Fifth Circuit held
this to be an abuse of discretion inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of
court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
Similarly, Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a party may amend his pleadings "by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party." The Fifth Circuit suggested that these provisions be
applied liberally to accord with the overall goal of the Federal Rules of
resolving disputes on the merits and in a single judicial proceeding. Liberal
construction was particularly compelled when an omitted counterclaim
was compulsory. The court found the mere passage of time between an
original filing and an attempted amendment insufficient grounds for denial of a motion to amend.
The importance of permitting amendments to assert compulsory counterclaims was underscored in United States BroadcastingCo. v. Armes,"'
in which the Fifth Circuit made it clear that where a claim should be
brought as a compulsory counterclaim in one action, it should be permitted
to be brought somewhere else in another action. A Texas district court had
enjoined a party from proceeding with a suit in another federal forum when
the claim sought to be raised in the other forum was appropriately viewed
as a compulsory counterclaim to the suit pending in the Texas district
court. The Fifth Circuit found no error in the injunction, since the "claim
clearly arises out of the'same transaction as Armes' claim in the present
suit and should have been pleaded as a counterclaim in the Texas federal
court." ' 2
Where a counterclaim should have been asserted in the pleadings but
was not, and the parties proceeded to trial on issues including the issue
which should have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim, the mere
failure to amend the pleadings to assert the compulsory counterclaim will
not bar a judgment on the counterclaim. The Fifth Circuit so held in Nat
1 3 The court noted that
G. HarrisonOverseas Corp. v. American Tug Titan."
a pretrial stipulation had raised the contested issue and that the issue was
tried with the explicit consent of the opposing party. The court held that
the losing party would not be heard to complain on appeal of the failure
111.
112.
113.

506 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 771.
516 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1975).
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of the counterclaimant to have made a formal motion to amend the pleadings under Rule 15(b). If the pleadings do not, however, sufficiently highlight an issue for trial and if the opposing party does not consent to trial
of the issue, it is error to permit trial on that issue. The party on trial
should have ample notice of the issues to be tried."4
XII.

DISCOVERY

Two 1975 cases discuss the extent of a litigant's right to discovery and
the extent to which the right can be limited by the trial judge. Dillon v.
Bay City Construction Co." was a class action brought to enjoin an alleged
pattern of racial discrimination in the sale of houses in a Mobile, Alabama,
subdivision and to compel one of the defendants to sell a specific house to
the named plaintiffs. The suit was filed on May 24, 1973. The individually
named plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction to prevent the sale of the house. Upon reaching an agreement
with counsel for the defendants that the specific house in question would
not be sold until after the hearing was conducted on the preliminary injunction, no hearing was sought on the temporary restraining order.
On May 30, 1973, the parties were notified that the district court intended to conduct the hearing on both the preliminary injunction and the
merits on June 5, 1973. The plaintiffs received their notice on May 31,
1973, giving them only five days in which to prepare their case on the
merits. Service was not even completed on all of the defendants until the
very morning of the hearing. On June 5, there was some misunderstanding
as to the scope of the hearing. The plaintiffs, thinking that their evidence
had been put on solely for motion for preliminary injunction, rested their
case. Immediately, the district judge apparently determined that it was
unnecessary to hear any of the defendants' witnesses and began to announce his proposed findings of fact from the bench. The district judge
held that there was no evidence that any class had been precluded from
purchasing homes in the subdivision and directed that any possible claims
should first be considered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under 42 U.S.C.A. §3610. As to certain of the other defendants,
the district judge found that there was no evidence of discrimination and
therefore dismissed the case as to them.
An appeal was taken, challenging the decision of the district judge on
several grounds including abuse of discretion in the advancement of the
case on the merits in such an accelerated manner. The Fifth Circuit
agreed, stating that the advancement completely inhibited the extensive
discovery and investigation required in a class action and to which the
plaintiffs were entitled under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce114.
115.

Freeman v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1975).
512 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975).
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dure. The court recognized the inherent difficulties in proving a pattern
of discrimination and particularly noted the necessity of discovery to assist
in resolving whether the action was one appropriate for class action certification under Rule 23. The court did not elaborate on the extent of the
plaintiffs' right to discovery under Rule 26. The nature of the court's comments, however, demonstrates that this would depend on the nature of the
particular proceeding, the complexity of the issue presented, and the determination of the existence of a class.
A similar claim of premature termination of discovery was made in
Merren v. A/S BORGESTAD,"6 which involved the applicability of the
Jones Act provision for a cause of action for damages for injured seamen." 7
The district court had granted summary judgment for the defendant. The
plaintiffs contended on appeal that they had not been given complete
discovery and that the district court should not have granted summary
judgment so as to terminate their right to discovery. In the Merren context,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention and held that all the facts necessary for the district court to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could
not make out a Jones Act case were then before the court and that any facts
which might be brought out by further discovery would be superfluous and
would have no relevance to the ultimate question.
In Britt v. CorporacionPeruana de Vapores,"5 the Fifth Circuit reiterated that the decision to impose sanctions for failure to make discovery is
one resting with the district court and not with the appellate courts and
that sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure only where there is a violation of a court order under Rule
37(a) compelling discovery.

XIII.

TRIAL

The use of special masters is a subject of significant and increasing
interest to trial practitioners and judges alike."' Cruz v. Hauck2 was a
class action, brought by indigent inmates of the Bexar County Jail in
Texas, challenging the constitutionality of restrictions on their access to
legal materials. The Fifth Circuit in an earlier appeal'' had remanded the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to be followed by
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of petitioners'
objections and the Government's justifications for the rules. On remand,
the district judge referred the matter to the U.S. magistrate to act as a
116. 519 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. 46 U.S.C.A. §688 (Supp. 1975).
118. 506 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1975).
119. For a general discussion of this subject, see Comment, Masters and Magistratesin
the Federal Courts, 88 HAiv. L. REV. 779 (1975).
120. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1973).
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special master to conduct the required evidentiary hearing. The class of
prisoners did not object at any time to the reference of the case to the
magistrate. After the hearing, the magistrate submitted proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to the district judge. The district judge
allowed the litigants to file objections but adopted the magistrate's report
with only minor modifications. The class of prisoners appealed to the Fifth
Circuit once again, contending, among other things, that the case was
improperly referred to the magistrate. Although the case was remanded to
the district court on other grounds, the reference to the magistrate was
upheld on the basis that the prisoners had waived their right to object. The
court, however, did state:
In view of the grossly protracted nature of these proceedings, and to forestall any further appeals by either litigant, the district judge personally
should conduct the proceedings on remand.'
Thus, because of the waiver aspect of Cruz, most of the discussion on the
subject of reference was dicta.
This discussion, although dicta, is significant for trial practitioners. In
1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act,"' which authorized
the assignment, pursuant to rules adopted by the majority of all the judges
in a district, of a magistrate to serve "as a special master in an appropriate
civil action, pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the
'2 4
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts.'
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure similarly authorizes a court
to appoint a special master. Rule 53(b), however, provides:
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule. In actions to be tried by jury, a reference shall be made only when
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in
matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference
shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
The court reviewed the history of special masters and particularly the
Supreme Court cases construing the "exceptional condition" limitation on
their use. 2 5 The court concluded that the "exceptional condition" limitation was a consequence of the perceived deficiencies in the master system
and was not required by the Constitution. These perceived deficiencies
were the expense and delay involved in references and the concern that
references might be to persons not ordinarily experienced in judicial work,
122. 515 F.2d at 332.
123. 28 U.S.C.A. §631 et seq. (Rev. 1968).
124. 28 U.S.C.A. §636(b)(1) (Rev. 1968).
125. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957), and
Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 47 S.Ct. 286, 71 L.Ed. 481 (1927).
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perhaps resulting in less public confidence in the factfinding process
underlying a judicial judgment. The court saw no reason why parties to a
lawsuit could not waive their objections to a reference. The court did
indicate that if the underlying controversy was one of a widespread public
interest, the need to maintain the confidence of the public in the factfinding process might become so important that a reference should be denied
even where the litigants consented. The court also made it clear that
parties' objections to a reference should be made prior to or at the time of
the reference. If for some reason that was not feasible, the objection certainly should be made at the earliest possible opportunity. Any other procedure, the court found, would allow a party disappointed with the results
of the reference to obtain a second bite at the apple by withholding his
objection to the reference until after the master's report was filed. Objection to a reference could not be made for the first time on appeal.
Two 1975 cases dealt with objections to jury instructions. Wallace v.
Ener2 6 held that Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," does not
require technical formality. The form of an objection is unimportant if the
trial judge is made to understand the objecting party's position. The court
found that the purpose of Rule 51 was to inform the trial judge of possible
errors in his charge at a time when he still had the opportunity to correct
them. In Wallace, the court found that all the appellant's assignments of
error in charging the jury either were raised in the post-charge, predeliberation conference or were set out in written requests to charge which
were filed with the court but which the court had refused to give. The Fifth
Circuit found that the appellant's positions were clear enough to inform
the trial judge of the possible error in his instructions and were, therefore,
sufficient to preserve the appellant's assignments of error.
In IndustrialDevelopment Board v. Fuqua Industries, Inc.,128 the court
held that an appellate court could notice a fundamental error in the charge
despite a failure to object to the charge at the trial, but that it should do
so only when it was sure that the trial court was adequately informed of
the litigant's contentions. In Fuqua, the court found that the appellant had
repeatedly and strenuously attempted to demonstrate his arguments to the
trial court to no avail. The Fifth Circuit implicitly concluded that continu521 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975).
Rule 51 states:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court
shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. No party may assign as
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the
objection out of the hearing of the jury.
128. 523 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1975).
126.
127.
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ing to argue his position, either by way of objections to the charge or
otherwise, would have been to no avail. The court pointed to language in
Keen v. Overseas Tank Ship Corp. which stated: "Nothing goes further to
disturb the proper atmosphere of a trial than reiterated insistence upon a
position which the judge has once considered and decided." 29 Clearly, the
safer procedure is to make one's objections to the jury charge immediately
after the charge when given an opportunity to do so and not to rely on
having strenuously argued a contention at some earlier point in the trial.
As to closing arguments to the jury, Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co. 30 made
it clear that where there are multiple parties, the failure of the district
judge to insist upon absolute equality of closing argument time will not be
grounds for reversal. The Jeter court held that in the context of a four-day
trial, the exposure of the jury to a few minutes more of argument on the
defendant's position than on the plaintiff's is not reversible error. Edwards
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'3' presents a closing argument which the Fifth
Circuit found "so far exceeded proper bounds and was so conducive to
prejudicing the jury's verdict that it substantially affected the total fairness of the trial.' 32 The court found particularly indefensible the presentation of facts to the jury which had not been placed in evidence, counsel's
discussion of the value which his own son would place on his father's life,
references to counsel's personal association with the deceased, counsel's
evoking the image of the deceased's children crying at the graveside and
forlornly awaiting the return of their father, and counsel's urging the jury
on the need for retributive payments from the defendants. The court found
the total thrust of the argument to have created inherent unfairness sufficient to require correction by the trial court even in the absence of objection.
XIV.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

Several recent opinions'33 provide a laundry list of considerations confronting the district court in determining whether preliminary injunctive
relief will be granted.
In Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co. ,' 3 the en banc court was presented
with the recurring problems of inflation and income taxes in computing
damages. The court held that possible future inflation is not to be included
in a calculation of future damages. This view aligns the Fifth Circuit with
129. 194 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1952).
130. 507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975).
131. 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 283-84.
133. Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Fletcher, 518
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975); Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1975).
134. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the majority rule among the circuit courts.'3 Penrod also held that a jury
should not be permitted to consider the impact of income taxes in calculating loss of future wages.
In Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., ' the Fifth Circuit rejected the rigid
third circuit rule which requires either expert actuarial evidence concerning the present value of future wages or mathematical guidance on the
method of reducing gross loss to present value as a prerequisite to submitting loss of future earnings to a jury. "7 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit was
not ready to concede that the application of the present worth rule is
beyond the undertaking of the average juror. Rather, the court believed
that the typical juror is sufficiently aware of modern economics to be able
to reduce gross loss to present value. The court went on to note, however,
that it is better practice to present either expert mathematical testimony
or actuarial tables to the jury in order to aid the jurors in "reducing gross
future lost earnings to their present value."
Several recent decisions's reviewed the right to recover attorney's fees.
Under the "American Rule," attorney's fees are generally not recoverable
unless provided for by statute or contract. As the court notes, however,
there are three exceptions to the American Rule: (1) when the losing party
has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons;"
(2) the private attorney general theory; and (3) the common fund exception.
XV.

APPEALABILITY, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, RES JUDICATA, AND

POST-JUDGMENT REVIEW

Courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from certain interlocutory
orders of district courts, including, under 28 U.S.C.A. §1292(a)(1), those
"granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions." In
EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 31 the Fifth Circuit was
called upon to determine whether the statute gives the courts of appeals
135. See Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970); Sleeman v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d
34 (2d Cir. 1960); Frankel v. Heym, 321 F.Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 466 F.2d 1226
(3rd Cir. 1972); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F.Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d
965 (9th Cir. 1967).
136. 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974).
137. Ballantyne v. Central R.R. of N.J., 460 F.2d 540, 544 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 879, 93 S.Ct. 133, 34 L.Ed.2d 133 (1972). In rejecting the third circuit rule, the Fifth
Circuit aligns itself with the majority of the circuit courts which have considered the question.
See Heater v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 497 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1974); Duncan v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 480 F.2d 79, 87 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 69, 38 L.Ed.2d
109 (1973); Baynum v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 456 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1972).
138. Gates v. Collier, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975); Newman v. Alabama, 522 F.2d 71 (5th
Cir. 1975); Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975).
139. 511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
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jurisdiction of denials of permanent injunctions. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had sued to have the district court order
the merger of thirty-seven segregated black and white local unions of the
International Longshoremen's Association operating within Texas. For the
most part, the locals opposed any such merger on the ground that the
maintenance of such segregated unions was simply an amenity for those
who wanted to associate with "their own." The EEOC and the Fifth Circuit were concerned that the maintenance of such segregated unions was
"invidious, in that it denies equal opportunities to workers and potential
workers, ,and is thus in violation of 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.," which is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.140 The Southern District of Texas
declined to find that the segregated unions in and of themselves were in
violation of the law, indicating that any economic deprivation that resulted from the maintenance of the segregated locals could be corrected by
a decree short of a required merger. The district court entered an interlocutory decree holding that the segregated locals were not required to merge
and that any violations of Title VII could be corrected by abolishing separate hiring halls and by establishing common seniority classifications. The
EEOC appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
There was no question that the district court's order was interlocutory.
It basically ordered the locals to confer with the EEOC in establishing
common seniority systems and hiring halls and to submit a plan to the
district court after such consultation. The district court retained jurisdiction with "full power and authority to issue any additional orders necessary
to insure equal employment opportunities. . .. ,,,'
The question presented to the Fifth Circuit was the appealability of the district court's
denial of the EEOC's requested permanent injunction against the maintenance of segregated unions and its requirement of a merger of the segregated locals. The Fifth Circuit noted that denials of preliminary injunctions had often been held appealable. The court reasoned that the grant
or denial of a permanant injunction finally resolves issues to a greater
degree than the denial of a preliminary injunction and that the potential
for irrecompensable injuries stemming from the denial of permanent injunctions was greater than that to be expected from the denial of temporary injunctions. It concluded that a denial of a permanent injunction was
appealable.
In Flowers v. Turbine Support Division,' the Fifth Circuit held that
denials of applications to proceed in forma pauperis are appealable. The
court reasoned that an order denying in forma pauperis status finally decided an important issue of which review should not be deferred. Denial
could result in the pauper litigant's being unable to successfully prosecute
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 276.
507 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the case to a traditional final judgment. The court buttressed its decision
on policies of judicial economy, noting that if the pauper proceeded to trial
and lost, the final judgment on the merits would have to be reversed if the
appellate court found that the denial of the in forma pauperis motion was
error and that the party's chances of prevailing had been prejudiced by
denial. If the pauper declined to proceed to trial and the district court
dismissed the action for want of prosecution, a reversal of the denial of
pauper status would similarly be required if it appeared that the denial
prevented the pauper from proceeding to trial or seriously prejudiced his
chances of winning.
The Fifth Circuit in 1975 dealt with a number of cases involving technical aspects of perfecting appeals. In Carr v. Grace,4 3 the court declined to
dismiss an appeal because of the appellant's failure to post the appellate
cost bond required by Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The court stated that the failure to post the cost bond should not, without
more, result in dismissal of the appeal. In Lashley v. Ford Motor
Company, 14 the court ruled that an appellant is not entitled to an additional three days for filing a notice of appeal when he is informed of the
district court's entry of judgment by mail. The appellant's counsel relied
on Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, both of which provide for additional
time after service of notice by mail. The Fifth Circuit held that the thirtyday requirement of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
commences to run from the entry of the judgment and not from the service
of the notice of the judgment on the appellant.
Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc. 5 involved the failure of the district court clerk to serve notice of the entry of judgment upon
the parties. The appellants did not learn of the entry of the judgment
against them until 103 days after the judgment had been entered. The
appellants immediately moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for leave to file the notice of appeal at that time. The district court
denied the motion for a new trial and denied the motion for leave to file
the notice of appeal but granted the motion for relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The district court then
entered a new order vacating its previous order and re-entering its original
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. The appellants then
filed a notice of appeal from the newly entered judgment. Rule 77(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically states:
Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal
or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal
within the time allowed. . ..
143.
144.
145.

516 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1975).
518 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1975).
523 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
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The Fifth Circuit found that the rationale of this provision was to enhance
the finality of judgments by placing the entire burden of determining
whether a judgment had been entered upon the parties. In other words,
parties are obliged to inquire periodically of the clerk or the court to determine whether a judgment has been entered. The courts, including the Fifth
Circuit, had strictly enforced Rule 77(d).1 11
The Fifth Circuit concluded that there must be an exception to Rule
77(d) where mitigating circumstances or special hardships are present. The
court pointed to a recent District of Columbia Circuit opinion 4 ' holding
that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should operate as
a vehicle to allow a timely appeal where parties had no actual notice of
the entry of judgment and the losing party moves to vacate the judgment
within a reasonable time after he learns of its entry. The Fifth Circuit
found mitigating circumstances in the appeal before it. The district court
had assured counsel that repeated inquiries were not necessary and that
counsel would be informed of the entry of judgment. Moreover, the court
noted that an appeal was a virtual certainty, since the case had been
pending for twelve years, had been appealed to the Fifth Circuit twice
before, and approximately one million dollars was at stake on an issue
where the parties were diametrically opposed. The court held that in such
circumstances, where neither side knew of the entry of judgment, where
counsel had promptly filed a notice of appeal after the action of the district
court in vacating and re-entering its judgment, where counsel had relied
upon express assurances from the district court that they need not make
inquiries, and where appeal was a virtual certainty,- the trial court acted
properly in vacating and re-entering its judgment under Rule 60(b).
Stokes v. Peyton's, Inc."I resolved an apparent conflict within the Fifth
Circuit between Turner v. HMH PublishingCo. "I and Markham v. Holt. 50
The issue on which the conflict existed concerned the effect of filing a
notice of appeal which is premature because a motion for a new trial is
pending, thus suspending the time for appeal and making the judgment
unappealable until after the motion for a new trial is disposed of. Turner
was a per curiam opinion holding that where a notice of appeal was premature, the appeal taken thereon was a nullity. Markham, on the other hand,
had held that that since there was no prejudice to the appellee and since
valuable rights should not be lost where a party had done an act too soon,
rather than too late, the appeal would be treated as being from the final
judgment and would not be dismissed. The Fifth Circuit in Stokes agreed
with Markham and held that it best comported with the spirit of the
146. See In re Morrow, 502 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institute, 500 F.2d
808 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
148. 508 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1975).
149. 328 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1964).
150. 369 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Federal Rules "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action"' 5' and to avoid decisions based on mere technicalities.
One of the more interesting Fifth Circuit cases of 1975, because it was
one of the greatest "race to the courthouse" cases of all time, was Shell
Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission.' The Natural Gas Act 153 provides
that one aggrieved by an order of the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
may obtain review in the "court of appeals . . . wherein the natural-gas
company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. . . ." After the FPC announced its ruling in the Shell Oil case,
the race to the courthouse commenced. The Fifth Circuit described the
race as follows:
This race by Rodman and Shell was in terms of multiple petitions filed
in interval of seconds. In each instance, the filings were accomplished by
relays of persons stationed between the issuing point of the Federal Power
Commission, the nearest available telephones, and the respective
courts.'
The various petitions were filed in the Fifth Circuit at 9:02:20, 9:02:22,
9:02:24, 9:02:30, and 9:02:45 on December 4, 1974. An appeal was filed in
the District of Columbia Circuit at 9:03:30 on December 4, 1974. The court
in a footnote stated:
We have carefully considered and reject Senator Abourezk's contrary contention based on the claim that the clocks in both the District of Columbia
and Fifth Circuits were wrong at the time of the various filings. (The clerks
of the two courts had synchronized the clocks just prior to the filings.) 55
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the race to the courthouse had been won
by the runner filing with it and that, therefore, jurisdiction to review all
appeals arising from the particular FPC opinion was in the Fifth Circuit.
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.' was a significant 1975 remittitur
case. The suit for $3.6 million arose from a death allegedly caused by
defective automobile tires. After an extended trial the jury awarded the
plaintiff $900,000. The defendants moved for a new trial and for judgments
notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied these motions but
found that the jury's verdict resulted from passion or prejudice and ordered
the verdict reduced to $450,000. The question posed on appeal was when
a remittitur, as opposed to a new trial, is the appropriate response to a jury
verdict affected by passion or prejudice. The Fifth Circuit said that where
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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509 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. §717r (Rev. 1963).
509 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id.
512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the "passion, prejudice, caprice, undue sympathy, arbitrariness or more
taints only the damage award and not the liability assessment, the proper
response is a remittitur or a new trial addressed to damages alone."', 7 The
court added, however, that "if it appears that the improper jury action, in
reasonable probability, affected both the liability and the damage issues,
then a new trial as to both issues must be ordered."'' 8 Applying those rules
to the facts presented in Edwards, the court found the issue of liability to
have been one strongly disputed. There was evidence that the deceased
was driving at a highly excessive speed while under the influence of alcohol. There was substantial expert testimony for the defense indicating that
there was no negligence and that the tires in question were not defective.
The court concluded that the issues of liability and damages were both
improperly influenced by the passions stirred up by improper argument of
the plaintiffs counsel, thus requiring a new trial on both damages and
liability.
Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad"9 dealt with the remittitur
of punitive damages. The case grew out of the death of a hunter who went
upon a trestle on the railroad's right of way and was struck by a train. The
jury returned a plaintiffs verdict for $225,000. The defendant moved for a
new trial. The district court denied the motion for a new trial conditioned
upon the plaintiff's acceptance of a $165,000 remittitur of punitive damages. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the remittitur abridged her
seventh amendment right to trial by jury. The plaintiff referred to earlier
decisions, Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.1 0 and Bonura v.
Sea Land Service, Inc., 8' which established, at least as to compensatory
damages, that a jury award could not be reduced below "the maximum
which the jury could reasonably find." The plaintiff contended that these
decisions were equally applicable to punitive damages. The court rejected
the plantiff's argument, stating that its logical extension would preclude
a federal court from ever reducing a punitive damages award. The court
reaffirmed its analysis of punitive damage remittiturs stated in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts:"2
The trial judge had the duty of determining whether as a matter of law
(a) any allowance for punitive damages could be made, and (b) what the
maximum would be. . . . Upon determining (b) he had then to decide
whether to grant a new trial or require a remittitur as to the excess. The
latter is a permissible course and does not infringe upon the Seventh
Amendment's guaranty of a jury trial.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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The court gave great latitude to the remittitur determination of the trial
judge based on his having heard the testimony and viewed the witnesses'
demeanor. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
any abuse of discretion in the trial judge's concern with the comparative
culpability of the parties or with regard to what was a fair verdict in terms
of his own experience as a judge.
In 1975, the Fifth Circuit decided a number of appeals concerning the
adequacy of findings of fact and conclusions of law in non-jury matters.
In Sellers v. Wollman,'"3 the court remanded a case to the district court
for failure to provide any findings of fact or conclusions of law. In two other
cases, Echols v. Sullivan' 4 and Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc. v. Tracor/Mas, Inc. ,'15 where the findings of fact and conclusions of law were
stated in conclusory terms, the Fifth Circuit remanded matters to district
courts. The court indicated that where findings are nothing more than
broad general statements, stripped of underlying analysis or justification,
meaningful review on appeal becomes impossible.
The court pointed out in McCawley v. Ozeanosun Compania, Maritime,
S.A.' 66 that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required to be
stated specially if there is a written opinion and the findings of fact and
conclusions of applicable law are stated therein. The purpose of requiring
findings of fact and conclusions of law is to facilitate appellate review. The
requirement need not be applied in such a technical manner as to prohibit
review where there is a sufficient basis to consider an appeal on its merits.
Two additional cases, Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc."'
and FloridaBoard of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc.,168 dealt with the practice of accepting
findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by counsel for the prevailing litigant. The court expressed disapproval of the practice of unconditionally adopting findings submitted by one of the parties to the litigation.
Its objection to this practice was that it deserved assurance that the trial
court had dealt with all conflicts in the evidence and had come to its own
conclusions. The court noted that while the practice of adopting findings
offered potential for abuse, it was not reversible error and that the "clearly
erroneous" test of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil'Procedure applied whether the court drafted its own findings or adopted findings submitted by a party. The Keystone Plastics opinion suggested a technique
that should be utilized by trial judges to accomodate the need of assistance
in preparing the findings with the imperative that the findings in fact be
the trial court's. The court suggested that the prevailing party be requested
163.
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to submit proposed findings and conclusions to the court and to serve a
copy upon adverse counsel. The court then would hold a hearing attended
by counsel for all interested parties, would hear argument and requests for
modification and, thereafter, would enter findings and conclusions. Such
a procedure would have the virtue of assuring that the trial judge had the
benefit of suggestions and argument from both sides and would more likely
lead to independent determinations by the trial judge.
An area attracting substantial attention in 1975 was that of the proper
standards for review of motions for judicial disqualification under 28
U.S.C.A. § 144.1"9 In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,70 the court
held that once a motion is filed under section 144, the judge should pass
on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit but not on the truth of the matters
alleged. The affidavits in Davis were held legally insufficent because the
allegation of prejudice was directed against the attorney for the party and
not against the party and because the requisite bias and prejudice must
be extra-judicial. That differences arise between a judge and a party in
some litigation is not a ground for a section 144 affidavit. This principle
was also set out in Curl v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.,7
This issue also arose in Parrishv. Board of Commissioners of Alabama
State Bar,' a case which was put en banc.'" The Alabama Black Lawyers
Association and eight named plaintiffs brought a class action alleging racial discrimination by the Boards of Commissioners and Bar Examiners of
the Alabama Bar Association in their policies and practices governing
admission to the bar. The plaintiffs filed an affidavit pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. §144 alleging that the district judge had been president of the
Montgomery County Bar Association at a time when its by-laws excluded
black members and that the district judge was acquainted with several
defendants in the suit. In support of the affidavit the plaintiffs appended
a transcript of a special hearing at which the trial judge had submitted to
cross-examination on issues relevant to his disqualification. The trial judge
stated, prior to his cross-examination:
169.

28 U.S.C.A. §144 (Rev. 1968) states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear
such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of
the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for
failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any
case. It shall be accompanied by certificate of counsel of record stating it is made
in good faith.
170. 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975).
171. 517 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1975).
172. 505 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Heretofore I had felt that a judge should recuse himself very quickly
because it made the court appear more fair, but there are other obligations
the court owes and I am afraid that I shan't recuse myself but I want to
give you an opportunity to put anything on record that you would like to
put on the record."'
The court reviewed two tests against which the legal sufficiency of an
affidavit might be tested: (1) whether the facts set out support the reasonableness of the affiant's belief that bias or prejudice exists, and (2) whether
the facts reasonably support a determination that bias or prejudice actually exists. The panel concluded that the appropriate test was the first
one.
We conclude that a trial court cannot be free from "any hint or apprarance
of bias" unless a party's sworn belief of the existence of bias, supported
by substantial facts, is of primary concern. Thus, we reject as invalid the
so-called objective test.'75
The panel concluded that the district judge had applied the wrong test in
the belief that it was his duty to decide the issue as to whether he was
actually biased rather than whether there was a reasonable basis alleged
for the belief of the plaintiffs that he was biased.
When the Parrishcase was put en banc, the original panel's determination was reversed. The court en banc adopted the test which had previously
been adopted by the Third Circuit: "That the facts be such, their truth
being assumed, as would 'convince a reasonable man that a bias exists.' ",
The en banc court reviewed the testimony appended to the section 144
affidavit and concluded that the affidavit did not require disqualification.
By the time the Parrish case reached the en banc panel, 28 U.S.C.A.
§455 had been substantially amended to set out in detail when judges
should disqualify themselves. The en banc panel thus viewed Parrishnot
only against section 144 but also against the amended standards of section
455. Section 455(a) requires that a judge disqualify himself in any proceeding in which "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Section
455(b)(1) requires that the judge disqualify himself where he has "personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party." The en banc panel concluded that
section 455 was intended to displace the subjective test for recusal with the
so-called "reasonable factual basis-reasonable man test" in determining
disqualification. The court then determined that under section 455 the
facts alleged would not lead a reasonable man to infer that the district
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
Standards for reviewing rulings on motions for new trial received substantial attention in 1975. The general rule is that a denial of a motion for
174.
175.
176.

505 F.2d at 16.
Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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a new trial will be reversed only where there has been an abuse of discretion
by the trial judge.'77 In Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 78 the Fifth Circuit indicated that the standard for reviewing an order granting a motion for new
trial is broader than for review of an order denying the motion. The court
reasoned that the factors underlying review of a new trial motion are (1)
deference to the trial judge, who has had the opportunity of observing the
witnesses and considering the evidence, and (2) deference to the jury's
determination. Where the judge denies the motion for a new trial and
leaves undisturbed the jurors' determination, all factors point toward leaving the judge's ruling undisturbed. Where the judge has granted a new
trial, however, the competing factors oppose each other. Deference to the
trial judge is subjected to the opposing tension of deference to the jury as
the constitutional finder of fact. Where a new trial is granted on the ground
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, scrutiny is even closer
than where the ground is some undesirable influence that intruded into the
trial, because the trial judge has substituted his judgment of the facts and
the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury.
1
In Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida,79
a case involving a motion for a new trial
under Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis
of newly discovered evidence, the Fifth Circuit indicated its intention to
review very carefully the granting of new trials on the basis of claims of
newly discovered evidence. Evidence which was available but not offered
at trial because of a "half-hearted effort" to produce it will not support a
motion for a new trial, and even if the trial court grants the motion, it is
likely to be reversed on appeal.
80
In Gamble v. Estelle,1
the Fifth Circuit held that the standard for
reviewing pro se complaints should be more liberal than for pleadings in
general. The court pointed to the obvious fact that pro se applications are
often by persons who are illiterate and unable to express themselves in the
clear and unequivocable language required in legal pleadings, thus necessitating the more liberal standard of review.
In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit noted that its review of consent decrees is narrow. The appellate court
should interfere with the implementation of consent decrees only upon a
clear showing that the district court abused its discretion in approving a
settlement. The court noted that it had no authority to modify or rewrite
a consent agreement of the parties. If it found an abuse of discretion by
the trial judge in approving a settlement agreement, its only alternative
wourd be to vacate the district judge's approval of the settlement and
remand for trial. The appellate court should not readily substitute its own
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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notion of fairness and adequacy of relief for those of the parties and the
district judge.
A number of interesting res judicata and collateral estoppel cases were
presented to the Fifth Circuit during 1975. The doctrine of res judicata has
two facets. The first is that the former adjudication bars future litigation
between the same parties as to all issues actually raised in the prior adjudication. The second facet, and one not so easily remembered or applied, is
that the former adjudication also bars future litigation between the same
parties as to all issues which could have been raised in the prior adjudication. ' The relationship of these two facets was explored briefly in Hall v.
Tower Land and Investment Co.'83 There, the plaintiff-appellant filed a
complaint which was virtually identical to a previous complaint which had
been filed and dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Fifth Circuit quickly concluded
that both actions were brought against the same party seeking the same
remedy in regard to the same property and that the same alleged right and
wrong were involved in both actions. The court went on, however, to state
that even if the plaintiff had taken the two counts of her complaint and
used one of them in the first action and the other in the second action, res
judicata would still prohibit relitigation, "for in both federal courts and
Texas state courts a judgment is final not only as to all matters which were
decided but also as to all matters which might have been tried."'' 4 The
court was, of course, on safe ground if both federal and state law were the
same, even though one or the other was not applicable.
The interesting conflicts of law question suggested by Hall was presented
to the Fifth Circuit in two other 1975 cases. In Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Askew,' 85 the court held that federal law governed both the questions of the
res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment based on federal question jurisdiction and also the res judicata effect where the prior suit was
brought only under diversity jurisdiction. The court stated: "The federal
doctrine of res judicata bars relitigating any part of the cause of action in
question, including all claims and defenses that were actually raised or
could have been raised."'' 8 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that where the
forum state's law of res judicata was narrower than the federal law and
where a litigant had an action involving both state and federal questions,
the application of the narrower state law would permit a party to split his
cause of action and thus circumvent the federal law of res judicata simply
by not pleading his federal claim or defense. The Fifth Circuit held that
the court in the second action must look beyond the pleadings to what
182.

See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947), and C&C
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could have been pleaded. The fact that the litigant in the earlier action
had chosen to plead and litigate only the state law questions would not
justify frustrating the federal law of res judicata. This determination by
the Fifth Circuit is obviously one having significant policy overtones. The
court explicated the policy considerations which it felt controlling:
The importance of preserving the integrity of federal court judgments
cannot be overemphasized-out of respect for the federal courts and for
the policy of bringing litigation conclusively to an end. If state courts
could eradicate the force and effect of federal court judgments through
supervening interpretations of the state law of res judicata, federal courts
would not be a reliable forum for final adjudication of a diversity litigant's
claim."17
The Fifth Circuit bowed politely to Erie considerations' but decided that
there were affirmative countervailing considerations and that the federal
system was an independent system for administering justice to litigants
who properly invoked its jurisdiction.
The Aerojet-General court acknowledged that there was "occasional
dicta" suggesting that state law might govern res judicata in diversity
cases but noted that the only two cases so holding 8 ' had contained virtually no discussion of the choice of law problem. The Fifth Circuit declined to follow those cases. Three months later, the court added to the
"occasional dicta" in Maher v.City of New Orleans90 when it stated:
Where federal jurisdiction is bottomed on state law, as in a diversity
matter, state law principles of collateral estoppel govern, under the rationale of Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins.
The court decided, however, that Maher was essentially a federal matter
and that, therefore, federal notions of res judicata and collateral estoppel
would control. The problem in Maher was that Louisiana law did not have
the second facet of res judicata; the prior adjudication barred subsequent
adjudication only as to matters actually litigated and not as to matters
which might have been litigated. An action was brought in a Louisiana
state court action on state questions. The subsequent action was brought
in the federal district court stating federal claims. Under Louisiana law,
the prior action had no res judicata effect as to the federal claims being
asserted in the district court. Under the second facet of res judicata, how:
ever, since the federal questions could have been raised in the first action
but were not, federal res judicata would seem to bar the second suit. Not
so, said the Fifth Circuit. Even under federal law, the court said, the
187. Id. at 716.
188. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
189. Murphy v. Landsburg, 490 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1973), and Provident Tradesmen's
B & T Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1969).
190. 516 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
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federal courts should eschew "rough hewn results" and should seek to
1
balance carefully "the interests implicated in finality determinations."""
The court concluded, by way of a footnote, that since the state court had
not addressed the federal questions and since a subsequent state court
action would not seem to be barred by local res judicata rules, the fact that
the matters raised "should have been litigated" in the earlier suit did not
foreclose the present action.'92 The court specifically noted that the prior
action had been in a state court. Thus, certain of the policy considerations
deemed important in Aerojet-General were not present in Maher. The
federal courts were not involved in determining the scope of their own
judgments. The Maher court stated that it did not have to decide whether
the same result would have obtained had the initial suit been brought in
the federal court operating under federal rules. Thus, Maher stands for the
proposition that the second facet of res judicata may not be an absolute
bar and may yield to other considerations in appropriate cases.
The Fifth Circuit failed to yield to the "might have been litigated" facet
of res jusicata in other cases as well. In Stevenson v. InternationalPaper
Co.,11 3 prior litigation (1) had complained of the transfer of blacks into
white unions without some transitional protection and (2) had alleged that
after the merger, the predominantly white unions had not fairly represented the interest of the new black members. A second action presented
a much more general attack against the practices of the company and the
unions, which, the plaintiffs claimed, perpetuated a system of employment
discrimination. The defendants in the second action argued that it was
barred by the first action on the ground that, even if the matters of discriminatory hiring, promotion, and seniority practices had not been raised
in the earlier litigation, they could have been litigated there and, therefore,
the plaintiffs were barred by res judicata from maintaining the second
action. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the two actions were "not identical" and that the first action barred relitigation of the issues of merger and
fair representation but did not bar consideration of the broader complaints
made in the second action. The court did not directly address the defendants' contention that the second action was barred by the "might have
been litigated" facet of res judicata.
The answer which was not given in Stevenson may have been given in
Dore v. Kleppe,'94 which, like Stevenson, was a class action. In Dore, the
Fifth Circuit took a broadside swipe at the "might have been litigated"
facet of res judicata:
But the federal rules do not require this . . . and we will not require it by
any such harsh, and erroneous, application of the doctrine of res judicata.
191.
192.
193.
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Rule 18 merely permits the joinder of other claims against the same party,
but, faced with a very real controversy, the pleader, to flee from res judicata, need not dream up all the imaginable disputes with the adversary
dependent on the outcome of the then controversy and as to which predictions on consequential impact would involve theorizing on hypotheticals.'"
The court went on to emphasize the necessity for encouraging manageability of class actions by limiting both the size of the class and the complexity
of the litigation. The court emphasized the "importance of maintaining
manageable units for determination."'' The court clearly felt that to apply
the "might have been litigated" facet of res judicata with too great enthusiasm in the class action context would be to encourage class plaintiffs to
bring in all conceivable future issues and parties in direct conflict with the
goal of "maintaining manageable units for determination." The court was
undoubtedly correct insofar as it went. It might well have gone one step
further, however, and balanced the administrative inconvenience of having
less "manageable units for determination" against its own burgeoning
docket, which is undoubtedly contributed to by repetitious relitigation
such as that in Stevenson and Dore.
The Fifth Circuit refused to apply res judicata/collateral estoppel analysis in a number of other contexts. In InternationalAss'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Nix,'97 the court held that res judicata does not bar
the litigation of issues in a subsequent action where those issues could not
have been litigated in the first forum. In Nix, the subsequent action involved state law contract claims which could not have been brought before
the National Labor Relations Board in the first proceeding. In the Poster
Exchange cases,"" the court refused to apply res judicata/collateral estoppel as a bar where the pleadings in the subsequent action might be construed to state new claims beyond those raised in prior suits and occurring
since the prior suits. In Greene v. General Foods Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit
refused to find res judicata/collateral estoppel a bar where nineteen years
had passed and the development of the law in the antitrust area had been
substantial between the prior litigation and the subsequent litigation.
A somewhat similar analysis was applied in Hampton v. Graff Vending
Co."" with regard to successive appeals. Hampton involved a RobinsonPatman Act claim. In its first appearance in the Fifth Circuit, 2 ' the court
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had found that Hampton had established a prima facie case of primaryline price discrimination in chewing-gum sales against Graff Vending Co.
and had remanded the case to the district court for consideration of injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The district court on remand had granted
both injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. In the second appearance before
the Fifth Circuit, Graff questioned the federal court's jurisdiction, arguing
that Hampton had failed to prove at least one purchase or sale "in commerce." This point had not been raised in the earlier appeal. The court
held that the fact that the issue had not been raised before was not "fatal"
because the law relating to Robinson-Patman jurisdiction had changed
between the time of the first appeal and the second appeal. 02
Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Houston National Bank2'0 may indicate
that the federal courts will take a much more active role in the review of
default judgment . In Nishimatsu, the Houston National Bank was the
holder of a contract signed "Southeast Construction Co., Ltd. by: Jack D.
Baize." The bank obtained a default judgment against Baize and Southeast Construction Co. (Secon) jointly and severally for $82,208. Baize filed
a notice of appeal, claiming that the judgment against him was erroneous
since he had signed only as Secon's agent. The bank contended that a
default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint established a defendant's liability and that Baize's appeal was an improper
attempt to relitigate on appeal a matter concluded against him by his own
default. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Baize and held that a default judgment is unassailable on the merits only insofar as it is supported by wellpleaded allegations. The court held that the defendant is not deemed to
have admitted facts that are not well-pleaded and is not deemed to have
admitted conclusions of law. The court stated:
In short, despite occasional statements to the contrary, a default is not
treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of
the plaintiff's right to recover. . . . On appeal, the defendant, although
he may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, is entitled to contest
the sufficiency
of the complaint and its allegations to support the judg2 04
ment.

The court found that the general averment that Baize had entered into a
contract with the bank was contradicted and controlled by the contract,
which showed that Baize signed only as an agent; therefore, the complaint,
to the extent that it sought relief against Baize on the contract, was incapable of supporting a default judgment.
In Baez v. S. S. Kresge Co. ,0' the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that a district
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court is vested with substantial discretion to determine whether to reopen
default judgments and that the Fifth Circuit would not "lightly overturn"
such a district court determination. The case involved a complaint served
on Kresge's registered Texas agent, mailed to Kresge's Michigan home
office, and then lost in the mail between the Michigan home office and
local Texas counsel. The Fifth Circuit, although indicating it probably
would have opened the default, affirmed the district court's refusal to open
and said Kresge should have established minimal internal procedural safeguards to prevent defaults from being suffered even in the event of the loss
of the complaint in the mail.

